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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
\
I~~\ Y

TANNER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v~.

Case
LTAH POULTRY
COOPERATI\TE,

&

FARMERS

a

corporation,

No. 9270

GEORGE RUDD AND CHARLES

P. RUDD,
Defendants and Respondents.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Come no"\Y the Defendants and Respondents and
respectfully 1nove this court for a rehearing on the
appeal herein and the decision on the same and urgP
the follo,Ying error in support of the n1otion.

1.

There was no ambiguity in the Release.

2. If it is necessary to look beyond the Release for
contemporaneous writings relating to its meaning, those
are already before the court in the cover letters admitSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ted in the answers to the defendants' Interrogatories to
the plaintiff.
3. There is additional consideration to uphold the
Release.
4. Payment of the conceded part of an unliquidated
or disputed claim is consideration.
5. The $4,000 sued for in the fifth cause of action
establishes that the claim was disputed.
6. The court's reversal is too broad- while holding
that the Release is limited to the 1951 crop, the Court
reverses the judgment of the lo\Yer court and allo\YS the
plaintiff to sue for $4,000 more for that crop.
BRIEF ON PETITIOX
It is with considerable trepidation that this n1otion
for a rehearing is submitted because the decision sought
to be reconsidered \Yas a unanilnous one and because five
judges of \vide experience, learning and integrity united
in that decision. But it is thought that there is Yital
evidence for \Yhich the case is being sent back to the
lower court, that is no\v before this court and \Yhich has
been overlooked. And the engaging thought that tllis
case can be disposed of by the fact that the eonsidera _
1. ion, \vlrirh the plaintiff received \lras only \Yhat l~e "~as
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entitled to, does not solve the problem because such
consideration is actually held to be sufficient and adequate as noted by \Villiston and other authorities.
For a reappraisal of these matters this motion for
rehearing is submitted.

AMBIGUITY IN THE RELEASE
r~rhe

court concludes that there \Yas ambiguity in the
Release because it was stated therein that the $9,350.06
\Yas the balance o"\ving under the marketing of the 1951
crop of turkeys and this court then says that:
". . . This would suggest that the release deals
"vith the obligations of the Cooperative arising
out of its Inarketjng Tanner's 1951 crop of turkeys.' (First paragraph at the top of page 2 of
the decision.)
As the court says in the next sentence that, while
the release does not confine its scope to the 1951 operations,
'~it

clearly suggests that such was the intention
of the parties."
The Release expressly covers a discharge from:
"any and all debts, claims, demands and accountings of \\·hatsoever name, nature and description. . . ."
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It covers all debts, all claims, all demands and all
accountings. Then to make it more certain that every""'
thing 'va.s included, there is added,
" ... of whatsoever name, nature and description."
Isn't the statement in the court's opinion; "vVhile the
words dealing with the Release do not confiJ1e it strictly
to the obligations arising out of the 1951 marketing.... "
a gross understatement? Do the 'Yords ''any and all
debts" etc, confine the meaning at all? Do those 'vords
restrict the meaning in any 'yay? Of course, they don't.
The only restriction, the only confinen1ent that is
found in the Release follo''Ts these boundless, all elnhracing 'vords :
"of "rhatsoever nan1e, nature and description"
'"'hen there is added:
"exceptin _r; ouly that I reserYe the right to receive
as the san1e may become due, "-hateYer smns n1ay
be paid from tin1e to ti1ne under the certificates
of interest issued to n1e and under the letters to
n1e fron1 the Cooperative adYising n1e that certain
credit~ hn.Y0 been retained.~' ( En1phasis added.)
Hl1~xet\pting

Only". That is the only restriction found
in this broad, li1nitless Re1ea8e. ,,. . here in the ,Yords
which follo'v "Excepting 0 nly'' is there any confine1nent
of those all inclusive "Tords ''any and all debts, claiozs,
den1n1uls and rrcco1ndi·ng·~ to r.lainu~ arising fron1 the
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marketing of the 1951 crop~ There is no confinement,
no restrieiion and no reservation "exoepting only" the
right to receive any future payments made on certificates
of inter(~~t already issued and retains described in advises
of credit.
How could it have more clearly stated that "any
an.d all debts" meant all debts and not just those for
1951 '? Would the addition of the words "from the beginning of tin1e to the present'' really have added anything to "any an,d all debts"~
Does this court 'vant to go on record that it is
necessary to add "from the beginning of time to the
present" in order to make a release of ''all debts'' mean
\\~hat it ~ays-Hall debts''? Especially when the broad,
all-inclusive 'vords are follo,ved by:
• •... except•1nb
0" on1y ... "

and the claims excepted from this broad, all-inclusive
language do not n_ame the claims arising from dealings
In p~r1or years.
The holding of this court that so clear-cut a statcInent as "any and all debts . . . of ,,. .hatsoever nanlP,
nature and description excepting only.... " is ambiguous,
is to cloud the la-\v of this state and \Yill force this court,
in future decisions, to qualify such holding until it is
eroded aY.-ny a11d it is finally adjudged that the release
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of "all debts ... of \vhatsoever name, nature and description" means exactly what it says.
IF IT IS NECESSARY TO LOOK BEYOND TI-IE RELEASE FOR ITS INTERPREITATION, THE SECONDARY
EVIDENCE IS ALREADY BEFORE THE COURT.

This court, after holding the words, ". . . . any and
all debts ... of whatsoever narne, nature and description. . . ." are ambiguous and might 1nean only those
arising frorn the 1951 crop, says that other evidence
of the intent is admissible and cites ·Continental Bank
v. Bybee (6 Utah 2nd 98, 306 P. 2nd 773). There this
court held that if the instrument \vas arnbiguous and
the uncertainty could not be cleared up "ithin the "'four
corners of the instrun1ent itself" that evidence should
be adnlitted of '~other conternporaneous \Yritings concerning the same subject rnatter'~ ( 306 P. 2nd 773 ).
1t is not necessary to send the case back to ascertain

these facts nor that intent. The lo\ver court srn11111arized
its findings on this subject in paragraph nun1bered 2
of the findings-portion of its "Tritten judgrnent and
particularly in subparagraphs j and k of paragraph 2.
This court has all that evidence before it no"T·
In the letter to the plaintiff dated Septen1ber 2,
1952 (Tr. 110) it \Yas stated that the settlen1ent (unnlunbered ~h0et bet\veen Tr. 98 and 99) o:n the 1951 cro~)
l.
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enclosed and explained it. Then reference was there
Inade to plaintiff's letter of August 25, 1952 (Tr. 100)
detnanding the right:

\\'as

". . . to inspect the records concerning all business transactions between the Association and
myself for the past three years . ... "; (emphasis
added.)
and threatening:
"to institute the necessary proceedings in a court
of law to obtain the records ....

"It is my sincere desire that you respond as
requested upon receipt of this demand; thus
avoiding expenses and unnecessary litigation.''
Returning again to the letter of Septe1nber 2, 1952 (Tr.
110) addressed to the plaintiff on behalf of the defendants, attention is called to the fact that:
"You have had your auditors inspect our
records on t\\~o occasions for a total of three or
four days in all and on each one your auditors
'vere given access to all of the records they
desired .... However, in view of the accountings
furnished from time to time to your attorneys
and the records made available to your different
auditors on their inspections, I believe' that you
·w·ill agree 'vith me that the blanket demand to
be subject to audit is not ti1nely. If, ho,vever,
there is information to \vhich you are entitled,
\\~ith \vhich you have not been favored, it "~ill
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"?ll

be furnished upon request, or your auditors
be permitted to inspect the records. yY e ':111,
therefore, await your further \Yord on this point.
''Under the circumstances I believe that we
'
should ask that you satisfy yourself
as to the
completeness and honesty of our accounting before we pay the balance of the funds due you
under such accounting. I am therefore asking the
Bank to present a receipt for your execution if
you are to use the check, a copy of ''Tlrich receipt
is enclosed herewith.
~'If

you are \Yilling to accept the check under
these limitations, please do so, or if you do not,
please return the check to the c;ooperative.''
Another conten1poraneous \\'Titten instrun1ent \Yas a
letter (Tr. 112) to the Far1ners and ~Ierchants Bank,
also of Septe1nber ~' 193:2 in ''Thich the $9,350,06 check,
payable to the plaintiff and to the bank, \v·as enclosed.
Reference is made to the "'seyeral de1nands for accounting fro1n us . . . . " made by l\Ir. Tanner and the end of
the seeond paragraph reads :
""But so that this n1atter 1nay be at rest, I an1
0nclosing a Re1Pa~e for his signature.
,"Please do not cash the enclosed check or
deliver the san1e to l\Ir. Tanner until he has
executed the enclosed Release in duplicate. r;pon
such execution, please have it \YitnessPd and for\Ya l'd both copies thereof to Ine, and deliver the
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check. If ~Ir. Tanner refuses to execute the
Release, please return the check to me."
The plaintiff, in his answer to our Interrogatory No. 24,
admits that he received a copy of this letter to the bank.
If there is need for further examination of contemporaneous communications between the parties, there
are the two reports of the auditors of the plaintiff, one
(Tr. 103) dated August 21, 1952 (four days before the
pre-emptory demand by plaintiff for all of our records
for the last three years and the threat of litigation if
thf\y 'vere not furnished) in which Mr. lVIann stated
that the investigation on "'"hich he 'vas then reporting
covered the 1949 crop and the report of the investigation
is set forth quite at length. This report ends 'vith the
caution:
'' 1Iore work by me for your account should
not be done, in my opinion, until you have had
time to think over the information in this letter
and we have met and talked further with Mr.
Lamoreaux "rho is getting a copy of this letter."
..:\nd then there is the final report ( Tr. 105) dated one
month after the defendant's tender of the Release and
the $9,350.06 in 'vhich

~lr.

l\fann begins:

''Having spent quite some time at the office
of the Utah Poultry and the 1~tah Ice it is my
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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feeling I had better report my findings to date
and let you decide the future course.
"Utah Poultry supplied me "\\rith all inventories and supporting data for the three years,
1949, 1950, and 1951. When I sa"\V the amount
of "\vork involved in checking the items out, I
decided to concentrate on 1950 at present, as I
told you over the phone."
Then follows a detailed report concerning the results
of investigation of the 1950 crop and again there is the
caution in the closing sentence of the report (Tr. 109):
'~Perhap~s

you \Yill want to have a n1eeting
now "\vith .i\lr. Lamoreaux and 1nyself to discuss
possible further procedures."
Other conten1poraneous letters \vhich thro\v light
on this include the one fron1 ~fr. Lan1oreaux to the
plaintiff dated August 11, 193:2 (Tr. 1~0) \\'"herein the
plaintiff's attorney reports concerning the three erop
years-1949 to 1951. This attorney for the plaintiff
closes his letter \vith the somber staten1ent:
HIt is n1y judgn1ent that they \vill giYe sonlething of an accounting next \Veek after "~hieh
ti1ne "Te "\Yill have soinething tangible upon ·zch ich
to procrrd." (En1phasiB added)
If a still "TidPr inYt..\stigation is sought for eonten1por-

aneous "\\'Titings, then see the letter fron1 the attorney for
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the plaintiff, nfr. Brockbank, dated June 24, 1952 (Tr.
116) in \\~hich this attorney accepts the defendant's
statement that the plaintiff did not market his turkeys
through the defendants, but sold his 1949 crop of turkeys
outright to the Utah Poultry. Plaintiff's attorney then
asks for information concerning the 1950 and 1951 crops
and specifically 'vhen and to whom they were sold and
the charges 1nade for processing, eviscerating, storage,
interest and insurance.
All of this information was before the lower court
'vhen it reached the conclusion that the release applied
to all claims, not just those relating to 1951. This same
information is available to this court and clearly shows
what the issue was between the parties-that the defendants wished to get through with the agitation and threat
of litigation and to lay at rest all matters be"\\"een the
parties.
If further evidence is needed by the court to clefini tely ascertain that ". . . . any and all debts . . . . of
whatsoever name, nature, and description .... " in the Release meant just \\"'hat it: said, and not the mere 1951
crop, observe the five weeks that intervened between
the dispatch of this $9,350 check and its acceptance .
.:\nd during that five weeks, the plaintiff sent his auditors
in, not to cheek out the 1951 records as this court felt
might be the case, but the 1950 records, as evidenced
by j!r.

~Iann's

report of October

~,

1952 (Tr. 105).
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This was not a Release which \Yas accepted \Yithout
adequate counsel, for plaintiff was being advised not
only by ~1:r. Brockbank (Tr. 116) but also by ~Ir. Lamoreaux, \vho reported to Plaintiff on August 11, 1952
(Tr. 120) and to whom reference is made by the auditor
in his two reports (Tr. 104 and Tr. 109). Both of these
attorneys were furnished copies of tl1e

t\YO

letters of

September 2, 1952 (See bottom of Tr. 111 and Tr. 112
for notations of persons to \\rhom copies \Vere sent).
It is respectfully submitted that the Release is not
ambiguous but that " . . . and all debts . . . of \Yhatsoever name, nature and description ... "means exactly
\\'"hat is says and that this is borne out by the contemporaneous \vritings by the parties during the period in question, and by the failure of the plaintiff to add to the
exceptions fro1n the scope of the Release, clain1s \Yhich
arose fron1 earlier years' transactions, if he or his la\Yyers had in n1ind that they \\"'"ere holding out c.lainlS
additional to those specifically 1nentioned in the R-elease
as being 0xcepte(l fron1 the tt}rn1s thereof.
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION TO UPHOLD RELEASE

In addition to the settle1nent of an unliquidated
and of a di8pntPd clain1, there is other consideration
"·hi~h

ronrts hav0 frequently· used to su8tain relea~es.
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A

DEFENDANTS PERFORMED AN ACT NOT OBLIGATORY

In 12 Am. J ur., Section 80, page 57 ..t-, it is stated:
''Perfor1nance of an aet by a promisee which
he is not legally obligated to perform is sufficient consideration for a promise, since it is a
legal detriment irrespective of \vhether it is an
actual detri1nent or loss to him.'' See 1 \\rilliston,
Con tracts Revised ( 8 vol.) Ed. Sec. 121, page 423.
Defendants were under no obligation to pay the
$9,350.06 to plaintiff until a release of the Bank's second
n1ortgage had been furnished to defendant. There was
no duty to issue a check \vith the names of both the
plaintiff and the bank (as \Yas done-see fourth paragraph of the letter of September 2, 1952, from Defendants to Plaintiff, Tr. 110) and to make the same available to plaintiff. But defendants did so in eonjunction
"yith their offer to rPlease that check to the plaintiff
and the bank upon the execution and delivery of the
Release in question. That offer vvas accepted by plaintiff hy executing and delivering the Release.
t~

There \\yas sufficient and adequate consideration
to sustain the Release in question.
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B

BENEFIT TO PLAINTIFF

In the much quoted U. S. Supreme Court case of
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. ·Clark, 178
U. S. 353, 44 L. Ed. 1099 this authority, after stating that
the compromise of a liquidated, undisputed claim by
the payment of a smaller su1n is unavailing as consideration for a release, goes on to add that -w. hile this rule
is \Veil settled,
it is considered so far "\Yith disfavor as to
be confined strictly to cases \Yithin it" ( 4-± L. Ed.
1105, middle right column 178 l"'". S. 365, top) ;
4

' ••••

and just belo\v this

quote~

the court adds:

... In Johnson v. Brannan, 5 Johns. 268, 271,
it "\Yas referred to as 'that rigid and rather unreasonable rule of the old la,v' ";
and further quotes fro1n eases critical of such a rule
'vhere, in one of then1, l\f r. Justice N" elson of the Supren1e
Court of N e\\~ York said of the rule that it:
is technical and not ver~~ \\~ell supported
by reason. Courts therefore haYe departed fron1
it upon slight distinctions.' " (end of the paragraps juRt referred to, -!--1- L. Ed. 1105' 17~ lT. .....~ .
B

'.

•

•

•

~

::1(15)
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And the Supreme Court in the Clark case further quotes
from Brook~ v. \vnite, 2 nfet. 283, 37 Am. Dec. 95, "\Vhere
the ~{assaehusetts court criticizes the doctrine and states:
Hence judges have been disposed to take
out of its application all those cases "\vhere there
"\\ras any new consideration, or any collateral
benefit received by the payee, "\vhich may raise a
technical legal consideration although it "\vas quite
appal'ent that such consideration was far less than
the amount of the sum due·." ( 44 L. Ed. 1105, 178
lT. S. 365, end of page in both)
4

•

In 1 Am. Jur., Section 53, page 245, this exception
to the general rule is treated thusly:
In a number of instances, it has been held,
in the case of a liquidated demand, that the giving
of the debtor's negotiable note or cheek to the
creditor is a benefit to the latter, and that therefore, if the creditor receives the debtor's note
or check for an amount less than is owing in full
satisfaction of his claim, it is a good accord
and satisfaction." (Citations)
44

This authority then discusses some cases cri1tical of
the doctrine just referred to and then at the bottom of
the same page, discusses the consideration as follo·wrs:
( 1 Arn . .J ur. p. 24~)
"From a practical standpoint it "\vould seem
almost self-evident that the note is of less value
than the cash, yet this might not al,vays be true,
as "\\rhere the note bears interest. But the reason
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why the note might constitute a good consideration \\Thile the cash might not is the same as
that ~iven by rthe courts \vhere 'a chattel, \Vhich
may be of little value is the consideration for
the discharge. The co~rts will not go into the
question of the value of the consideration in the
lat~ter class of cases, but will assume that the
chattel had a value to the creditor sufficient to
sup·port the agreement, else he \\~auld not have
made it."
In 1 C.,J.S. at page 496, it is said:
"Even where the rule [of Pinnel's Case, 5
Coke 117a, 77 Reprint 237] is firmly established,
ho\vever, it is regal"ded \\"'ith disfavor having repeatedly been criticized as teclmical, harsh and
of doubtful validity, and it is accordingly followed
\Vith reluctance in many instances and is strictly
confined by the courts to cases falling within its
terms and reason. ~Ioreover, a number of exceptions to the rule are recognized. . . . and it has
been said that the 1noden1 tendency of the eourts
is to enlarge the exceptions, in order to avoid the
har~hness of the rule and to carry se-ttle1nents,
adjustn1ents and co1npro1nises into effect.~,
In addi~tion to the consideration arising from the
settle1nent of a dispute and the settleinent of an unliquidated debt, there i~ this consideration in defPndants'
offpr \Yhieh plaintiff accepted:
The plaintiff had 1no~tgaged tllis erop of turkeys to
the Farn1ers and l\lerehan ts Bank of Provo, ns indica ted
in the Jetter to ])efendants (Tr. 110).
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rrheir's

\Ya~

a second mortgage. The Far1ners and
~r()rchants Bank of Provo is the one so named in the
letter (Tr. 11:2), a copy of \vhich plaintiff admits receiving in hi:-; ans\ver to Interrogatory K o. 24. It \vas to that
bank that the check and Release were sent.
Defendants "\\rere under no obligation to pay over
the $9,350.06 surplus arising from the sale of the 1951
turkeys, to either plaintiff or the bank. Until the latter
t\YO, jointl~~,

made demand for the money, specifying

the proportion to \vhich each \vas entitled or plaintiff
and the bank litigated their respective claims, defendants
could only pay at their peril.
The defendants tendered payment of

~the

$9,350.06

on multiple-payee check if the Release in question was
signed by plaintiff (Tr. 111 and 112.) Plaintiff accepted
the offer and signed the Release.
The Plaintiff benefited:
a. by getting immediate payment of $9,350.06 instead
of suffering a delay until the matter could be litigated
or proof produced to satisfy as to the respective rights
of the parties in the surplus 1that is, by paying before
it \\~as due (Note 2, 1 \Villiston on Contracts, Section 121,
page

-±~3),

and
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b. by avoiding the necessity of litigating the issue
as to what was due Bank and what \Yas due Plaintiff,
and
c. by avoiding the necessity of going to the bank
and then to defendants to get this sum.
Even though the court should hold that the settlement of the dispute between the plaintiff and defendants
as to whether the amount owing was $9,350.06 as claimed
by defendant or $4,000 more than that as claimed by
plaintiff in his fifth cause of action, was insufficient
consideration, and even though the court should hold
that the settlement of the unliquidated amounts as to the
sums received on each of the sales, as to the charge for
each hundreds of purchases of supplies, and as to the
charges for processing, eviscerating, freight, storage, etc.,
"~as not consideration, yet there \Yas consideration for
the Release in the tender of a check for the $9,350.06.
PAYMENT OF CONCEDED PART OF CLAIM AS
CONSIDERATION

Payment of the conceded part of a disputed or unliquidated claim is generally held to be valid consideration for a release of the entire clai1n.
'~On

the other hand, the tendencv of the later
rases, evidently influenced by a desire to avoid
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the rigid and unjust rule of the old la\Y, seems to
be to sustain the discharge \vhere there is a dispute as to an~~ part of the elai1n made hy the
creditor, although the 11ayment is only of the
s1naller amount ''Thich ,,~as conceded by the debtor
to be due. In other \Vords, the general rule that
acceptance of a part of an indebtedness \vith a
pro1nise to discharge the \Vhole is not binding
does not apply \\'"here there is a dispute as to
\\'"hether a larger or smaller amount is due, although the payment upon receipt of which the
promise to release is made is only the smaller
amount conceded to be due." ( 1 A1n. J ur. sec. G-l-,
page 251)

•·Not infrequently though a clai1n is unliquidated, or the subjeet of a bona fide and reasonable disputP, it is conceded that at least a certain
a1nount is due. It 1night seem that in paying this
conceded part of the claim, or any less0r amoun~t,
the debtor 1ras 1nerely do£ng 1Dhat he was pre~riously bound to do, and that, therefore, the payInent could not be valid consideration and some
courts so hold. The· majority, however, looks at
an unliquidated or dispUJted claim as a ,,·hole .and
so looking at it, does not atten1pt to set a value
upon it, or to define the extent of the debtor's
legal obligation. Accordingly, such a claim is
deal1t y,·ith as a horse is dealt y,,.ith, as something
the adeqllacy of \\'"hich as consideration \\'"ill not
be n1easured; and the payment of the an1ount
ad1uittedl~r due \Yill support a promise to discharge the ,,,.hole clai1n." ( 1 \V"illiston on Contracts
Ec-'\·i:.:P(l (R Yol.) Ed. p. 439) ~0P alRo 1 CJS 513.
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Plaintiff and defendants could have agreed, when
contracting initially, that the amount ":hich the defendants would pay plaintiff for his turkeys would be $9,350.06 but ·they did not do so because no one knew the
number or sales price of the turkeys nor the amount
nor price of the feed to be fed and supplies required
nor the amount of the charges for processing, eviscerating, storage, freight, etc. So the clain1 was unliquidated
during the time the turke·ys were being fed, killed, processed, etc. When did it become liquidated? Only when
defendants accounted and the plaintiff accepted (agreed
to) the accounting. Was there an acceptance of the accounting prior to the execution an{delivery of the Release~ There was none. As argued in more detail below·,
there was no time when the plaintiff was legally bound
by the accounting until he delivered his executed Release
and received his money. Until that moment, the obliga~
tion bet-\Yren the parties " . as unliquidated.
~This

court says at the conclusion of the last long
paragraph at the end of the opinion:
"The payment being for the exact a111ount
"'"hich the parties had agreed ",.as o"..ing to plaintiff from the 1narketing of his 1951 turkeys, there
"ras no consideration given for the release of any
other liability ovred to plaintiff.''
As pointed out above, the authorities agree that payn1ent
of only the portion of the rlai1n conceded by tl1e one
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paying, is sufficient eonsideration if the claim is either
disputed or unliquidated. The obligation bet"\veen the
parties \\·as both unliquidated in 1nany particulars (sales
prite of the turkeys on each of 1nany sales at varying
prices, purchase price of the hundred odd lots of feed
and supplies charged against this herd, the tenns of the
contract as to defendants' right and obligation to sell,
the a1nount charged for hauling to the plant, for killing, processing, eviscerating, storage, insurance, freight,
ete.) and also disputed (as to the $4,000 claimed to be
O\\~ing on the 1951 crop and as to the threats of litigation
\\~hich \\'"ere actually 1nade by plaintiff and in1plied 1n
the audits and the demands of the attorneys).
1fay \Ve ask the court when the parties "
had
agreed [\\~hat amount] \vas o\ving ... " ·~ Plaintiff had not
agreed that $9,350.06 \Yas o\ving at tl1e time he sent his
auditor, Thir. ::\lann in to make the last examination
\\~hich \\~as reported (Tr. 105) one month after the defendants offered plaintiff the $9,350.06 in full settlement of
··any and all claims ... of \Yhatsoever name, nature and
description .... " There \\~as no agreen1ent until plaintiff
aecepted defendants' offer by delivering the executed
Release and received the cheek. Until that 1noment the
rlaiin \Yas unliquidated.
l~ ntil

plaintiff delivered the executed release in
exchange for the check in liquidation of "any and all
claims ... of \Yhatsoever nan1e, nature and description"nntil that n1o1nent plaintiff eould have refused to agree
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to accept the $9,350.06 as full payment. He could have
claimed an additional $4,000 for which he is now suing
in the fifth cause of action, or questioned the prices obtained for his turkeys or the charges for feed, supplies,
hauling, processing, eviscerating, storage, insurance,
taxes or freight.
Until he accepted defendants' offer by the delivery
of the executed Release and accepted the $9,350.06, there
\vas no liquidation of this unliquidated obligation. He
could have gone to the Bank, signed the release and, as he
handed it over and reached for the check, he could have
changed his mind and refused to accept the offer to
liquidate, by refusing to deliver the release and sued for
the $9.350.06 and the $4,000 he no\v claims is O\Ying; or
sued for not $9.350.06, but $20,000 or $30,000 or more.
Could we have succesfully defended such suit by showing
that there "Tas an agreement bet"\\'een the parties that the
amount O"\ving "\vas $9.350.06 ~
agree~

,,~hen

did plaintiff so

He didn't. In the illustration, he

\Yas

about to

agree but he changed his n1ind and on trial \Ye \vould
have to prove each sale and the price received therefor
and each eharge for feed, eviscerating, taxes, freight, etc.
And on the other hand, defendants could sho"\v any new
calculation that reduced its obligation belo\v $9,350.06
and the plaintiff could ~ho\\T our indebtedness \vas $1,000
or $nO,OOO.
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~ince

the obligation \Yas unliquidated (and also
because it "~as disputed) the pay111ent of the conceded
part \\·as arnple consideration for the Release in bar of
thP present action. This is in accordance with the authorit:ic)~ ( 1 ~\1a. J ur. See. 64, p. 251; 1 -\Villiston p. 439; 1
CJS ;)1:1) eited and quoted above. And this is true
heeause there \Yas no agreernent liquidating the $9,330.06
as the total arnount o\\~ing, until the offer to so agree \Yas
accepted by the delivery of the executed release.

SETTLEMENT OF A DISPUTED CLAilVI AS CONSIDERATION FIFTH CAUSE, FOR $4,000 l\IORE THAN PAID

The settlement of a disputed claim is generally
recognized ns consideration for an accol'd and satisfaction.
'"Settlement of an unliquidated or disputed
clairn, \\~here the parties are apart in good faith
presents such consideration." Bro\vning v. Equitable LifP Assurance Society 9-1 Utah 532, 72 P.
:2nd 1060 nt 1068 (emphasis added), Ashton v.
~keen, S5 r~tah -l-89, 39 P. ~nd 1073 at 107G.
H\\-.-here a claim is not a rnoney demand, or,
if so, is unliquidated, or, if liquidated, there is a
bona fide dispute as to the stun actually due, or
a bo}1L1. fide doubt or controversy exists as to
\Yhether anything is due then an accord and satisfaction rnay be established and held binding, altllo-__:_gh the:L. e is a payment of a surn less than that
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claimed by the creditor or even a sum less than
that which, on an actu~l computation, might be
found due to the creditor." 1 Am. Jur. Section
60, p·. 249.
"A disputed claim may be either liquidated or
unliquidated. A claim of A against B for $5,
admittedly lent by A to B, but concerning the
payment of which there is a dispute, is a disputed
claim; but the amount of the clain1, if it exists
at all, is fixed. As the amount of an unliquidated
clain1 is unknown, and as either the existence
or the amount of a disputed claim is unkno"\\rn,
\vhether a claim is unliquidated or disputed, it
con1es under the rule generally applicable to considerrution, that the la,,r, \\~here it can avoid doing
so, "rill not atten1pt to put a value on a consideration agreed upon by the parties. The surrender of a disputed claiin, \\Thether unliquidated
or liquidated, if the dispute is honest and not
obviously frivolous is, therefore, consideration
"Thich the la ''"' cannot a tte1npt to value. Accordingly, any sun1 given and accepted as consideration for an agreement to discharge a claim which
is unliquidated or the subject of bona fide and
reasonable dispute is sufficient eonsideration."
1 Williston on Conrtraets (1936 Ed) p. ±37 and
438. See Fuller Y. 1'01~11\ 138 N.\T. 231, 33 N.E.
10i34.
The plaintiff received the pa~r1nent of $9,350.06 but
no\V claims (in the fifth cause of action of the ease at
bar) that $4,000 1nore is O\Ying. In other \\~orJs, plaintiff
is claiming that the an1oun t o\ved \\Tas not $9,350.06 but
$13,350.0(). Defendants offered and 11laintiff accepted
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$9,:350.06 in full payment of this disputed claim. The
release \\·a~ given to evidence the accord and satisfaction
of thi~ di~puted claim.
Courts have al,vays encouraged men to settle their
diffprencPs 'vithout court assistance if possible. The
relea~e in the case at bar 'vas such a settlement, one
entered into advisedly - vvhile the plaintiff's t'vo attorneys looked on. The release should be upheld.
'"The payment and acceptance of a lesser
amount than is claimed by a creditor may constitute a good accord and satisfaction of the 'vhole
claim, vvhere it is unliquidated or in dispute,
even though the creditor 'vas not botmd to make
any· reduction in his claim, or the amount paid
is no more than the debtor concedes to be due."
1 C.JS 512.
In vie'v of the claim for $4,000 additional on the fifth
cause of action, it is inescapable that the amount ovving
on the 1951 crop \\Tas in dispute. Because it was in
dispute, the payn1ent of the $9,350.06 and the acceptance
of it \\Tas sufficient consideration for the Release and the
~a1ne should be upheld and the judgment of the lo,ver
eourt, sustained.
THIS COURl.''S REVERSAL IS TOO BROAD

This court concludes that the Release applies only
to the 1951 crop.
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" ... the release 'vas only of liability arising out
of rthe 1951 marketing of turkeys" (Third line
from bottom of the third paragraph from the
end of the judgment of February 9, 1961).
If the Release applied to 1951, then the discharge
claimed by defendants applied to the debt sued on in the
fifth cause of action. There it is claimed that $4,000
more is owing on the 1951 crop than was paid. If, as
held by this court, the Release applied only to the 1951
crop, it still 'vas a release of liability for that crop and a
bar to the fifth cause.

_It is submitted that the judgment of this court should
sustain the court below so far as concerns the fifth cause
of action.
It is respectfully submitted that:
1. The judgment of the lo,Yer court should be sustained because
a. If there is ambiguity in a release from ''any and
all debts ... of \\'"ha tsoever nan1e, nature and description''
it is cleared up by tl1e exception "\Yhich follo,vs but does
not exclude any clailns for prior years.
b. If resort need be to conten1poraneous \\~ritings,
they are before the court in the other letters ad1nitted by
plaintiff.
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c.
~ince

Thl\re is additional consideration for the Release
giving the Inultiple-payee check and making the

funds inunediatPly available without a showing by the
~;pcond

1nortgagee of its interest and without requiring

litigation through suing both the bank and plantiff and
paying the money into court.
d.

The payn1ent of the conceded part of a disputed

or unliquidated claim is consideration for the Release.
e. The settlement of a disp.uted claim is consideration for the Release.
f. The settlement of an unliquidated claim is considPration for the Release.
g. The holding that the Release applied only to the
1~)51

crop and the reversal of the judgment sustaining

Release as to the 1931 crop are inconsistent.

Respectfully submitted,

IRWIN ·CLAWSON
Attorney for Defendants
and Respondents
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